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Abstract Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many
thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the
assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this
problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with
psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that
animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in
which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the Lockean of the problem of too many
thinkers.
Keywords Personal identity  The problem of too many thinkers 
Functionalism  Lockeanism  Sydney Shoemaker
Sydney Shoemaker (1999a, 1999b, 2004, 2008) has proposed a functionalist
solution to a problem of too many thinkers that arises for Lockean accounts of
personal identity. Lockeans claim that persons have psychological persistence
conditions and, given that animals do not have psychological persistence conditions,
they must deny that persons are identical to animals. But such a denial becomes
problematic when it is combined with the very plausible assumption that animals
share the thoughts of the persons they constitute. If wherever there is a thinking
person there is a thinking animal distinct from it, then there are at least twice as
many thinkers as we thought there were—hence the problem of too many thinkers.
Most will find this consequence preposterous, and some take it to be an excellent
reason for rejecting Lockeanism and affirming our identity with ‘‘our’’ animals (e.g.
Snowdon 1990; Olson 2003). Others, including Shoemaker, take it as a reason for
denying that our animals can think.
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This latter move is not prima facie appealing. Our animals would appear to
share with us all the features relevant to having thoughts. They have the same
brains and nervous systems, the same perceptual systems, the same environ-
mental inputs and the same behavioural outputs, to name but a few. So how
could they fail to think? Shoemaker’s answer is that animals have the wrong
persistence conditions to think. It follows from the functionalist nature of
properties that what properties a thing can have depends partly on what sort of
persistence conditions the thing has, and Shoemaker argues that ‘‘mental
properties, and whatever physical properties same-subject determine them… can
belong only to things having psychological persistence conditions’’ (Shoemaker
2004, p. 528).
Shoemaker’s proposal is of particular interest as property functionalism is an
independently motivated and plausible thesis. If it really had the consequence that
animals cannot think, this would provide much needed support for Lockeanism.
Unfortunately for the Lockean, it does not. Although it is true that there is a
dependency relation between what properties a thing can have and its persistence
conditions, there is little reason to believe that this dependency is such that mental
properties can only be had by things with psychological persistence conditions.
After outlining the core tenets of Shoemaker’s position and his argument for why
animals cannot think, I propose two different ways in which his argument fails to
establish its intended conclusion.
1
The central claim of Shoemaker’s functionalism is that properties are individuated
by the conditional causal powers they bestow on their bearers (see e.g. Shoemaker
1980/2003). If we call the entirety of conditional powers bestowed by a property its
causal role, we can make the point by saying that P and P* are the same property if
and only if they have the same causal role. Expanding slightly, to have a conditional
causal power is to be liable to bring about certain successor states in certain
circumstances. Thus, P and P* have the same causal role, and so are the same
property, if and only if their instantiation will result in the same successor states
under all possible circumstances. This is the crucial idea behind Shoemaker’s
argument against animal thought.
The second idea on which Shoemaker’s argument rests is that it is definitive of
the causal role of some properties that their instantiation will bring about certain
successor states in their bearer:
[T]here is an internal relation between what properties an individual can have
and what its persistence conditions are. This is because the causal powers
which the properties of a thing jointly bestow on it are individuated in part by
how their manifestation will influence the future career of that very thing.
(Shoemaker 2003, p. 4, my italics.)
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I will call properties that stand in an internal relation of this sort to their bearer’s
persistence rich properties.1 Mental properties are primary examples of rich
properties, and other rich properties include various dispositional properties such as
elasticity.
Something is elastic just in case it, that same thing, will change shape when
certain forces are applied, and then revert to its original shape when the forces
are removed—it is constitutive of something’s being elastic that its future
career will go a certain way under certain conditions… similar points apply to
other dispositional properties, and they apply as well to the properties in which
these properties are realized. (Shoemaker 2008, pp. 316–317.)
Similarly, the potential successor states definitive of mental properties must be
states of the bearer of the property, and the specification of the causal roles of such
properties must make reference to what will happen to the bearer of the property,
given that certain other properties are instantiated by the bearer, under certain
conditions. Thus, for instance, my desire to drink will, all other things equal, result
in my drinking, if I also believe I can drink, and that my desire stands in these
relations to my other drink-related states and actions is partly constitutive of its
being a desire to drink.
2
Shoemaker’s argument against animal thought runs as follows. Given the difference
in the persistence conditions of animals and persons, there will be certain conditions
under which the animal and the person can come apart, such that each might
continue to exist without the other. Under such conditions, the person’s mental
properties and the animal’s supposed mental properties will not have the same
successor states or actions. But that means that the alleged mental properties of the
animal and the bona fide mental properties of the person differ in their causal roles.
And so, given that properties are individuated by their causal roles, they cannot be
the same properties. This is a restricted version of the more general argument
contained in the following passage, which I will call the causal roles argument:
If there can be coincident objects which have different persistence conditions,
there will have to be a difference in the properties of these things
corresponding to a difference in their persistence conditions. Suppose that A
and B coincide, but that their persistence conditions differ in such a way that
under condition C they will cease to coincide and will go their separate ways.
If the powers of A dictate that under condition C the possessor of these powers
will have such and such properties and such and such a spacetime trajectory,
1 In places, Shoemaker gives a very similar characterisation of what he calls thick properties, but his
notion of a thick property is stronger than the notion of a rich property just given. Thus, Shoemaker builds
it into the notion of a thick property that it cannot be shared by objects with different persistence
conditions (e.g. 2003, p. 1), and this does not follow from richness alone.
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obviously these powers, and the properties that bestow them, cannot all be
shared by B. (Shoemaker, 1999a, p. 298.)
We can take the supposed scenario here to correspond to familiar brain transplant
scenarios. Imagine that a person’s brain is transplanted into another animal in such a
manner that the thought processes it supports go on interrupted and the person
whose consciousness and mental life is supported by the brain after the transplant is
perfectly psychologically continuous with the person whose consciousness and
mental life it supported before the transplant. The Lockean reading of such a
scenario is that the person ‘goes with’ the brain and leaves its animal behind.
Assuming for the sake of argument that this is correct, we can assume also that the
mental states of the person before transplant will continue after transplant to
generate the successor states that are definitive of their being the states they are.
Let us suppose, for instance, that prior to the transplant the person was thinking
through some argument premises and that after the transplant her reasoning results
in her drawing a conclusion suitable to her thinking about these premises. Or
imagine that just prior to the transplant the person realised she could afford to go on
a holiday, and that after the transplant she is appropriately excited and starts
pondering where to go. Although it might have appeared that before the transplant
the animal was following the same reasoning and having the same realisations about
potential upcoming holidays, the thought runs, this can now be seen to be a
misperception. The animal’s alleged reasoning does not result in its drawing a
conclusion, nor does the idea of a holiday excite it. Instead it just lies there after the
transplant, stripped of thought and emotion, instantiating none of those successor
states typically constitutive of the having of mental states. If you’re tempted to
respond that the person’s post transplant states are successor states to the animal’s
states too, be reminded that mental properties and whatever properties realise them
are rich properties, such that their appropriate successor states must belong to the
same thing. As such, the post-transplant person’s states couldn’t be appropriate
successors to the animal’s mental states. Shoemaker thinks such considerations
show that animals cannot have mental properties.
3
One might worry that functionalism does not in itself commit one to a Lockean
reading of brain transplant scenarios and so the argument must rely on Lockean
assumptions about the persistence conditions of persons (e.g. Olson 2002). But this
is not my worry. If functionalism plus Lockeanism entailed that animals cannot
think, that would be important enough. And as I am concerned here with whether
functionalism can be employed to defend Lockeanism, and not with how
Lockeanism might be established, I am happy to assume here that the Lockean
reading is correct. Further, I do not wish to challenge the functionalist thesis that
properties are individuated by their causal roles, nor indeed the observation that
many, if not most, properties stand in an internal relation of sorts to their bearers
persistence conditions. I think we can grant all of this and still not be moved to the
conclusion that animals cannot think.
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I have two responses to Shoemaker’s argument. The first response grants that the
argument establishes that animals’ mental properties would have to be slightly
different from those of persons, but denies that this has the consequence that
animals cannot think. The second response grants that there are possible scenarios in
which the mental properties of the animal and the person do not bring about the
same successor states, but denies that it follows from this that their properties differ.
I discuss each in turn.
4
Assume for the moment that Shoemaker’s argument establishes that the causal roles
of the alleged mental properties of animals must be different from the causal roles of
the mental properties of persons. Assuming also that properties are individuated by
their causal roles, it follows from this that animals cannot have exactly the same
mental properties as the persons they constitute. It does not follow from this alone,
however, that animals cannot have any mental properties. They might rather have
slightly different mental properties from persons; the sort that belongs to animals
rather than persons and as such do not bring about appropriate successor states in the
imagined brain transplant scenario. Indeed, given that the causal roles of the alleged
mental properties of animals will otherwise be exactly like those of the mental
properties of persons, this seems like the right thing to say. And, moreover, this is
precisely the sort of claim that a defender of the causal roles argument will have to
make with regards to non-mental properties if he is to save the argument from the
following reductio.
The causal roles argument, recall, is a general argument. Assuming that it does
work, we may conclude that any property of the animal that has a successor state
under the brain transplant condition must have a different causal role from any
property of the person that does not have such a successor state under that condition.
And this will include all of the animal’s biological properties, (save perhaps some
having to do with a part of the brain), as well as any physical properties that realise
those. So if we are to take it that the causal roles argument entails that animals do
not have mental properties, then we ought similarly to conclude that persons do not
have any biological properties nor indeed any biology realising physical properties.
And this ought to strike most people as a reductio of the position.2 It thus transpires
that unless, perhaps, you are willing to embrace immaterial souls, you cannot accept
the causal roles argument without some complementary method for cost-reduction.
The obvious manoeuvre here is to claim that persons do have biological
properties, they just have slightly different biological properties from their animals;
the sort that belong to persons rather than animals and that as such do not bring
about appropriate successor states in the imagined brain transplant scenario. And
indeed, this is precisely what Shoemaker himself says. Acknowledging that it is
2 See Olson (2002) for a complaint along these lines, though his construal of Shoemaker’s argument, as
well as his response to it differ significantly from the ones given here.
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‘surely unacceptable’ to deny that persons have biological properties, he claims we
ought rather conclude that persons have slightly different biological properties.
[T]he transfer of my cerebrum to a different body … might lead to my losing
my immunity … while my present biological animal, left behind as a human
vegetable, would retain its immunity. … So immunity to smallpox in persons
has a slightly different causal profile than immunity to smallpox in biological
animals, and these are arguably slightly different properties. (Shoemaker
2008, p. 323.)
Shoemaker thinks that the correct conclusion is that persons have slightly different
biological properties from animals rather than that they have no biological
properties. And not only does he think this, he also claims that this strategy allows
us to ‘‘still hold that persons have all of the kinds of physical properties we take
them to have’’ (Shoemaker 2008, p. 324).
It may be that biological predicates that are applicable to human animals are
applicable as well to persons, but that they have slightly different senses, and
ascribe slightly different properties, in the two sorts of applications.
(Shoemaker 2008, pp. 322–323.)
This seems to me a sensible suggestion. The only trouble is that a precisely
analogous manoeuvre would seem to recommend itself in the case of mental
properties. Shoemaker acknowledges as much, but adds that ‘‘this would play havoc
with my solution to the too many minds problem and seems to me to have nothing to
recommend it’’ (Shoemaker 2008, p. 323). But it seems to me that this manoeuvre
does indeed have something to recommend it. First, hypothetical separations from
their persons aside, animals would appear to fulfil all the criteria for having mental
properties that their persons do. So there is a positive reason for thinking that
animals do indeed have mental properties. Second, the case of biological properties
and the case of mental properties seem relevantly similar to warrant analogous
moves, and as such one would seem to need a reason for not making the suggested
move in the mental case, given that one makes it in the biological case. But aside
from causing havoc with Shoemaker’s proposal, it is not at all clear what might
count against it.
I conclude that even if we do grant Shoemaker that the mental properties of
persons and animals would have to differ slightly, there is no obvious reason why
we ought not say that animals and persons do nonetheless satisfy all the same mental
predicates, and animals have all the kinds of mental properties we take them to
have.
5
I think we can go further. We need not grant Shoemaker that the mental properties
of persons and animals must differ at all, even assuming that functionalism is true
and brain transplants are correctly given a Lockean reading. Lockean assumptions
granted, what the brain transplant scenario shows us is that under brain transplant
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conditions the mental states of the person bring about successor states in the person
that the animal’s supposed mental states fail to bring about in the animal. But that in
itself does not entail that the properties must differ in their causal roles. For that
follows only if it is also the case that the condition under which one state generates a
successor is the same as that under which the other state fails to generate a
successor.
According to functionalism, if it is constitutive of a property P1 that it brings
about a successor state SS under certain circumstances C; then if P2 does not bring
about successor state SS under those very same circumstances C, then P2 is not P1.
But why should we think that the circumstances of the animal and of the person are
the same in a brain transplant case? Applying the causal roles argument to mental
state realisers, Shoemaker claims that:
Given that the persistence conditions of the human animal allow it to become
a human vegetable through the transplantation of its cerebrum to another
body, the property of the human animal expressed by the predicate ‘has a
cerebrum in physical condition X’ cannot bestow the same conditional causal
powers as the property of the person expressed by that same predicate. (1999a,
p. 301, my italics).
So, let us follow Shoemaker in taking ‘transplantation of its cerebrum to another
body’ to pick out our test condition. It is true that under this condition, the properties
of the animal and the properties of the person will not result in the same successor
states. But that only shows that the properties differ in their causal roles if
‘transplantation of its cerebrum to another body’ picks out the same condition for
the animal and the person. And there are good reasons to doubt this.
Shoemaker claims that the difference in successor states to ‘having cerebrum in
state X’ in the animal and the person under the condition of ‘transplantation of its
cerebrum to another body’ shows that ‘having cerebrum in state X’ picks out
different properties when applied to animal and person. But it seems at least as
plausible to say that ‘transplantation of its cerebrum to another body’ picks out
different conditions for the animal and the person, and that prior to the transplant the
animal and the person ‘have a cerebrum in state X’ in much the same sense. Indeed,
there are quite different things involved for the animal and the person in having their
cerebrum transplanted to a different animal. On the one hand, as far as the animal is
concerned ‘transplantation of its cerebrum to another body’ involves it having its
cerebrum detached from itself and moved into a different body. On the other hand,
where the person is concerned, ‘transplantation of its cerebrum to another body’
involves it having a whole body and lower brain transplant. It is very far from
obvious that this is the same condition. It seems plausible that not only is there a
difference between these conditions, but that it is precisely the sort of difference
required for explaining why the animal’s states and the person’s states fail to bring
about the same successor states. Indeed, it is hard to think of a better excuse for not
following an argument to its conclusion than the loss of one’s brain.3
3 This research was carried out while holding a Jacobsen Fellowship at the Royal Institute of Philosophy.
I am grateful to Tim Crane and Colin Johnston for their comments on earlier drafts.
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